

charismatic submission to authority. Bonnke's connections with the apartheid regime of South Africa in the 1980s remain largely unexplored. Gifford does give a fuller treatment to the Faith Gospel movement, which promises a share of wealth and success to its disciples; he argues that it offers little for African development (p. 243). This is his own field of expertise, and he uses it to good advantage. The connections between this prosperity teaching, however, and the political impact of the movement, is never made clear.

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Guimarães, Fernando Andresen. 1998. THE ORIGINS OF THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR: FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND DOMESTIC CONFLICT. Basingstoke: Macmillan; and New York: St. Martin's Press.

When the United Nations Security Council decided to end the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) on February 26, 1999, it implicitly admitted its latest failure to bring about peace in a country which, according to Henderson (1979), has experienced five hundred years of conflict. While the failure of its fourth attempt is partially due to the unwillingness of the world body to commit the necessary resources, it also attests to the deep-seated roots of this conflict and the ability of the involved parties to draw continued support from a variety of sources. As I write this in May 1999, Jonas Savimbi's Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) is allegedly receiving weapons from Uganda and Rwanda via the Congolese Rally for Democracy, the rebel movement attempting to overthrow Laurent Kabila, the man it helped bring to power just a year earlier.

In light of these developments, a new review of the origins of the Angolan civil war is certainly needed, and Guimarães' volume promises to go beyond the Cold War rhetoric and focus on the deeper roots of the conflict. Specifically, he sets out to demonstrate that the Angolan civil war of 1975–76 was not primarily a result of Cold War politics driven by the interests of the superpowers, but the outcome of a power struggle between

three liberation movements in their respective attempts to overthrow a recalcitrant Portuguese colonialism.

The volume is divided into two parts which address the internal sources and the externalization of the Angolan conflict, respectively. Part I begins with a short review of Portuguese colonialism which relies in large part on existing secondary literature. The analysis of Angolan anti-colonialism traces the origins of the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA from their respective sources among the radicalized urban *mestiços*, the Bakongo of the north and northeast, and the Ovimbundu of the southeast. Guimarães hastens to assure the readers that these ethnic designations were by no means the source of the conflict but that these “may have been exploited by movements and personalities in their political conflicts” (p. 34). This section ends with a review of the exile years between 1962 and 1974.

The second part recounts the events of the civil war of 1975–76, followed, in turn, by an account of the roles of foreign powers in the conflict. In the remaining three chapters, Guimarães analyzes of the roles of Zaire and South Africa, Cuba and China, and the United States and the Soviet Union. These chapters offer little new information but attempt to integrate the sometimes disparate information contained in the available sources. A typical example is the debate surrounding the timing of the Cuban intervention in 1975. Guimarães challenges the official Cuban account which portrayed the dramatic airlift of Cuban soldiers in early November 1975 as a hasty response to a South African invasion. Instead, he arrives at the conclusion that the Cuban intervention took place in three stages, beginning between May and June 1975, during which contingency plans for further involvement were drawn up. Guimarães concludes the book by restating that the conflicting trajectories of the three liberation movements were determined by the social conditions created by the intransigent nature of Portuguese colonialism prior to the involvement of external actors, whose actions nevertheless served to exacerbate the conflict.

While Guimarães provides a competent review of events leading up to the civil war of 1975, he fails to shed any new light on the conflict which might aid us in dealing with the current conundrum. Much of the factual information has already been made available through Marcum’s (1969, 1978) two-volume account of the Angolan revolution, which the author acknowledges. The primary reason for this conclusion is that the book does not go far enough. I know of no knowledgeable observer of southern African politics who would claim that the roots of the Angolan conflict lie exclusively in Cold War politics. A closer analysis of the social conditions inside Angola which brought about the tripartite division of the opposition to colonial rule would have added significantly to the volume. However, the book remains firmly within a state-centered approach and does not venture beyond a chronological account of the actions of the main players.

What is lost in the process is exactly the sort of investigation which

would have shed light on the persistence of this conflict. Was the civil war simply a conflict between the three headstrong leaders of the liberation movements? How were they able to maintain their followings? The question of ethnicity and colonialism, for example, remains largely unexplored. Were Savimbi or Roberto pure “instrumentalists” who parlayed latent ethnic consciousness into political power, or did they address real or perceived grievances widespread among their respective constituents? Did the relations with the Portuguese on the one hand and the Bakongo and the Ovimbundu on the other play a role? Such questions receive only scant attention. Answers to them would have added significantly to our understanding of the Angolan civil war.

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Angola is living through its fourth decade of war. From 1961 to 1974, three nationalist movements—National Front for Liberation of Angola (FNLA), Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and National Union for Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA)—led a war for national liberation against the Portuguese colonial administration. This war ended after the overthrow of the fascist regime in Portugal on April 25, 1974 by a group of Portuguese army officers dissatisfied with the increasingly high human and material costs of the conflict. The new Portuguese regime quickly granted independence to its African colonies. Tragically for Angola, however, independence did not usher in a new era of peace and development. Instead, the nationalist movements, unable to overcome deep-seated ethnic and ideological divisions among them, plunged the country into a fratricidal war even before independence from Portugal was officially granted on November 11, 1975.

Various attempts have been made to assist the three nationalist movements in reconciling their differences. Thus far, all such attempts have ended in failure. Paul Hare's book is an insider's account of the inter-